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A Framework for Identifying Accounting Characteristics for Asset 
Pricing Models, with an Evaluation of Book-to-Price 
 
Abstract 
We provide a framework for identifying accounting numbers that indicate risk and expected 
return. Under specified accounting conditions for measuring earnings and book value, book-to-
price (B/P) indicates expected returns, providing justification for B/P in asset pricing models. 
However, the framework also points to earnings-to-price (E/P) as a risk characteristic. Indeed, 
E/P, rather than B/P, is the relevant characteristic when there is no expected earnings growth, but 
the weight shifts to B/P with growth. Using this framework we resolve a puzzle: in contrast to 
previous empirical research, we find that leverage is positively associated with future returns, as 
predicted by theory. 
 
Keywords: Book-to-price; earnings-to-price: growth and risk; accounting principles   
JEL Classifications: G11 G12 M41 
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A Framework for Identifying Accounting Characteristics for Asset 
Pricing Models, with an Evaluation of Book-to-Price 
 
1. Introduction 
A long stream of papers documents correlations between firm characteristics and future stock 
returns. Empirical asset pricing research interprets some of these observed “characteristic” 
correlations as evidence of a risk-return relationship and then proceeds to construct asset pricing 
models with common risk factors based on the characteristics, as in Fama and French (1993). 
Many of the characteristics involve accounting numbers, such as book-to-price, book rate-of-
return, and investment. However, these characteristics have largely been identified simply by 
observing what predicts returns in the data, a data mining exercise that has resulted in a 
proliferation of characteristics.1 A number of explanations for the phenomena have been offered, 
although many of these are just conjectures. Presumably to emphasize the severity of the 
problem, Novy-Marx (2014) finds that returns predicted by many of the observed characteristics 
can be explained by sunspots, the conjunction of the planets, the temperature recorded at Central 
Park Weather Station in Manhattan, and other seeming absurdities.  
  This paper presents a framework for identifying valid accounting characteristics for 
asset pricing, yielding additional conditions for the identification beyond simply predicting 
returns in the data. The framework develops from an expression that connects expected returns to 
expectations of earnings and earnings growth, with the connection to risk determined by 
accounting conditions. An identified characteristic is one that satisfies those conditions. The 
ability to predict returns empirically then serves as validation.  
 We apply the framework to investigate book-to-price (B/P), identified in a “characteristic 
regression model,” by Fama and French (1992) (FF) who then proceeded to construct an asset 
pricing model in Fama and French (1993) that includes a book-to-price factor. That model stands 
as perhaps the premier empirical asset pricing model, though subsequent research has expanded 
                                                 
1 In a survey of published papers and working papers, Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) find 316 predictors, a number 
they say likely under-represents the total. Green, Hand, and Zhang (2013 and 2014) find that, of 333 characteristics 
that have been reported as predictors of stock returns, many predict returns incrementally to each other. 
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the set of characteristics to promote additional common factors, resulting in a proliferation of 
factors (as well as characteristics).2 There is little theory for why B/P might indicate risk, though 
conjectures abound.3 Our framework provides an explanation: under a specified accounting that 
bears resemblance to GAAP, B/P forecasts expected earnings growth that the market deems to be 
at risk. Our empirical analysis supports the predictions from our framework.  
However, while the framework validates B/P in the FF model, it also points to earnings-
to-price (E/P) as a valid characteristic. Indeed, with no expected earnings growth, E/P alone 
predicts the expected return and B/P is irrelevant. With growth, the weight shifts to B/P. The 
paper also shows that the relative weights are related to firm size, another FF factor: for smaller 
firms that typically have higher growth expectations, B/P is important for forecasting returns but, 
for large firms with lower growth expectations, B/P is not important while E/P takes primacy. 
Further, the paper shows how the relative weights on E/P and B/P depend on the accounting, 
with the expected return under fair value accounting (where B/P = 1) given by E/P, but with the 
weight shifting to B/P under historical cost accounting (where B/P is typically different from 1).  
 The paper also applies the framework to investigate the pricing of financing leverage risk 
in the FF model. FF factors are said to incorporate financing risk, but there is no formal analysis 
as to why. Indeed, Penman, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) show that the FF model does not price 
financing leverage appropriately. Our framework separates the components of E/P and B/P that 
pertain to operating risk from those that pertain to financing risk, with the expected returns 
associated with each identified and reconciled to the expected equity return in accordance with 
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) leveraging equation.  
This separation enables us to revisit an issue long outstanding in empirical asset pricing: 
While a basic tenet of modern finance, formalized in Modigliani and Miller (1958), states that, 
for a given level of operating risk, expected equity returns are increasing in financial leverage, 
                                                 
2 Additional factors include momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), investment (Liu, Whited, and Zhang, 2009 
and Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2015), profitability (Novy-Marx, 2012 and Fama and French, 2015), accruals quality 
(Francis, LeFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2005), among others. 
 
3 Explanations for book-to-price include: (i) distress risk (Fama and French, 1992), (ii) the risk of “assets in place” 
vs. “risk of growth options” (Berk, Green, and Naik, 1999; Zhang, 2005), (iii) low profitability (Fama and French, 
1993), (iv) high profitability (Novy-Marx, 2012), (v) investment (Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2015; Gomes, Kogan, and 
Zhang, 2003; and Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008) (vi) operating leverage (Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino, 
2004), and (vii) q-theory (Cochrane, 1991 and 1996 and Lin and Zhang, 2013).  
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research has had difficulty in documenting the positive relation. Indeed, papers largely report 
negative returns to leverage.4 This is puzzling given how fundamental is the idea that leverage 
requires a return premium. The failure to validate such a fundamental tenant of modern finance is 
presumably due to a failure to identify and control for operating risk. By unlevering E/P and B/P 
to capture operating risk, we are able to show that equity returns are increasing in leverage. This 
not only yields an empirical documentation of the leverage effect that has escaped earlier 
research, but also validates our framework: it identifies operating risk such that one observes that 
leverage is appropriately priced. And it points to a deficiency in the FF model: both E/P and B/P 
are relevant and, once that is recognized, leverage prices according to theory.  
Our analysis maintains the standard assumption in asset pricing research that the market 
prices risk efficiently. There is no imperative, of course, but we wish to address the research on 
its own grounds. 
2. The Framework: Connecting E/P and B/P to Expected Returns 
The framework involves two key ideas. First, expected returns can be expressed in terms of 
expected earnings and subsequent earnings growth, with that expected return determined by the 
risk that these expected outcomes will not be realized.  Second, given price, B/P and E/P are 
accounting phenomena, so how they connect to risk and return depends on the accounting. With 
the focus on B/P, the framework establishes conditions for the accounting for book value under 
which B/P can (or cannot) indicate the risk of expected earnings and earnings growth not being 
realized. Further, as book value and earnings articulate under accounting principles, the 
accounting for book value also determines earnings, and thus E/P is also identified as a potential 
risk characteristic. 
We stress that the framework is not a formal model that connects accounting 
characteristics to priced risk. That would require a generally accepted asset pricing model (that 
identifies priced risk), and that we (collectively) do not have. While the general form is laid out 
in no-arbitrage asset pricing theory in terms of common risk factors and sensitivities to those 
factors, it is the identification of factors that has proved difficult. That, of course, is what the ad 
                                                 
4 See Bhandari (1988), Johnson (2004), Nielson (2006), George and Hwang (2010), Ipplolito, Steri and Tebaldi 
(2011), and Caskey, Hughes and Liu (2012), for example. Penman, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) report the negative 
relation with the FF model.   
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hoc empirical approach is trying to do—identifying characteristics from correlations with returns 
in the data—and it is at this level that this paper operates. However, rather than identifying 
characteristics simply by observed correlations with returns, the framework sets up additional 
conditions to be satisfied. The empirical analysis then tests whether these conditions are indeed 
satisfied.  
We establish conditions under which (levered) E/P and B/P convey information about 
expected levered returns and unlevered E/P and B/P convey information about expected 
unlevered returns. Leverage then explains the difference between levered and unlevered expected 
returns implied by these multiples consistent with no-arbitrage asset pricing theory. That sets up 
our tests of whether leverage is priced empirically according to theory. 
2.1 Expected Levered Returns 
The data dredging approach to identification of characteristics targets forward stock returns. We 
start by expressing these returns in terms of forecasted accounting outcomes via the clean surplus 
accounting relation governing financial statements.5 This relation states that the book value of 
common equity, B, increases with comprehensive income, Earnings, and decreases with the 
distribution of net dividends to equity holders, d: Bt+1 = Bt + Earningst+1 - dt+1. The equation is 
typically applied to substitute earnings and book values for dividends in the numerator of the so-
called residual income model (see Ohlson 1995, for example). But that research has nothing to 
say about the denominator of the valuation model, the expected return at which the numerator is 
discounted―the issue in this paper. Re-arranging the equation, dt+1 = Earningst+1 - (Bt+1 - Bt) and 
substituting for net dividends in the stock return (with firm subscripts omitted), the expected 
dollar return is explained by expected forward earnings and the expected change in the premium 
of price over book value:  
                      E(Pt+1+ dt+1 - Pt) = E[Earningst+1 + (Pt+1 - Bt+1) - (Pt - Bt)]                                 (1) 
(Expectations here and everywhere below are at time t when prices are formed.) Dividing 
through by Pt to yield the expected one-year-ahead rate-of-return,  
                                                 
5 The formulation requires that clean-surplus accounting must apply only in expectation. Clean-surplus accounting 
may be violated in accounting for earnings realizations, but expected deviations from clean-surplus must be mean 
zero (as with the unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities that are recorded in comprehensive income 
under GAAP and IFRS accounting). 
 
5 
 
             
)
)()(
(
)(
)()( 1111
11
t
tttt
t
t
t
t
ttt
P
BPBP
E
P
EarningsE
RE
P
PdP
E


 

                (1a)  
The identity in equation (1) has long been recognized for realized returns, for example in Easton, 
Harris, and Ohlson (1992). We adapt it here to apply to expected returns.6  
If there is no expected change in the premium of price over book value, equation (1a) 
shows that the expected rate-of-return is equal to the expected (forward) earnings yield. 
However, given the earnings yield, a forecast of the expected return is completed with a (price-
denominated) forecast of the change in premium.  
That, of course, requires an explanation of what induces a change in premium. First note 
that payout does not affect premiums: dividends reduce book value, dollar-for-dollar, under the 
clean-surplus accounting operation and also reduce price dollar-for-dollar under Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) (M&M) conditions.7 Rather, an expected change in premium is induced by 
expected earnings growth, as shown in Shroff (1995). If dividends do not affect the premium, the 
expected change in premium due to the change in book value comes from earnings, by the clean-
surplus relation: E(Pt+1 – Bt+1) – (Pt – Bt) = E[(ΔPt+1 + dt+1 – (ΔBt+1 + dt+1)] for all E(dt+1) and, 
with E(ΔPt+1 + dt+1) set by a no-arbitrage condition given Pt, the change in premium is 
determined by E(ΔBt+1 + dt+1) = E(Earningst+1). Thus, for a given Pt, lower expected t+1earnings 
implies an increase in the premium in t+1.8  
                                                 
6 Our focus is on the one-year-ahead expected return, the object of most of the research that predicts returns, 
including our empirical work. However, at points below, the expected return is expressed as a constant over future 
periods for simplicity, with the understanding that multi-period expected return is not necessarily the expected return  
under an equilibrium asset pricing model (as often stated in interpreting bond yields). Our task is simply to identify 
characteristics that might direct the construction of an asset pricing model, as in Fama and French (1992).  
 
7 Dividends increase financing leverage and thus the expected return, but that is reflected in the E/P component of 
the expected return which is increasing in leverage (see later). Some argue that, because of tax effects, price drops 
by less than a dollar per dollar of dividends. Accordingly, we control for the dividend yield in the empirical analysis.  
 
8 In other words, Pt is based on expected life-long earnings at time t so that, for a given price, the lower the earnings 
expected for period t+1, the higher are earnings expected after t+1. That is expected earnings growth. This simply 
reflects the workings of accrual accounting: accrual accounting allocates earnings to periods so, for total life-long 
earnings expected in Pt, lower t+1 earnings means higher earnings in the future.  The Internet Appendix 
demonstrates.  
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However, while equation (1a) supplies a calculation for the expected return, it holds for 
all accounting methods for allocating earnings to periods―even accounting that books earnings 
to periods randomly; equation (1) is, after all, a tautology. The clean-surplus relation is not 
sufficient; further specification is necessary for the accounting allocation to have implications for 
risk and the corresponding expected return. That accounting must convey information about risk 
that requires a discount to the current price, Pt, the denominator in equation (1a), to yield an 
expected return commensurate with the risk. That is, the discount (in price) of expected life-long 
earnings is conveyed by the allocation of those earnings to periods.  
We consider four accounting cases. With a focus on B/P, we evaluate how B/P indicates 
the expected return in each case, establishing conditions under which B/P bears no relation to the 
expected return and conditions under which it does. The latter are the basis for our empirical 
tests: are the conditions satisfied in the data?  The four cases are demonstrated in the Internet 
Appendix9. At all points, we assume that the market prices risk appropriately (market efficiency), 
as is standard in asset pricing research. 
2.1.1 Accounting where B/P has no Relation to the Expected Return 
Mark-to-market accounting. If E(Pt+1 – Bt+1) = Pt – Bt = 0, the expected return equals the forward 
earnings yield,
t
t
P
EarningsE )( 1 , by equation (1a). The case is illustrated with a mark-to-market 
bond. The expected one-period yield on a bond indicates its expected return and, under accrual 
accounting, the effective interest method equates the expected earnings yield to the bond yield. A 
bond cannot have earnings growth beyond that from a change in the effective amount borrowed, 
but that is determined by the coupon rate, that is, payout. Thus, there is no expected change in 
premium. 
 It follows that the FF model does not apply to mark-to-market bonds. Nor does it apply to 
equities under mark-to-market accounting: B/P = 1 irrespective of the risk, so B/P cannot 
indicate the expected return. However, the expected earnings yield indicates the expected return, 
                                                 
9 The Internet Appendix is available at the following link: 
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/25571/Appendix%20on%20Penman%2
0Web%20Page.pdf 
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yet the earnings yield does not appear in the FF model (while B/P inappropriately does). Case I 
in the Internet Appendix demonstrates. 
Permanent income accounting (no growth). For stocks, price usually differs from book value 
because of historical cost accounting, so one looks to features of historical cost accounting that 
induce a premium and thus potentially links B/P to expected returns. A benchmark case is that of 
“permanent income” where earnings are recognized such that expected Earningst+1 is sufficient 
for all future earnings: with full payout, E(Earningst+τ) = E(Earningst+1) for all τ such that there 
is no expected earnings growth. Applying the clean-surplus relation with a constant expected 
return, r, the expected premium for all t + τ is given by 
).(
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Thus expected premiums are constant. Less than full payout results in earnings growth from 
retention, but payout does not affect premiums. With no expected change in premium,
t
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P
EarningsE
RE
)(
)( 11

  , by equation (1a).  
 As these conclusions hold for all Pt – B t, it follows that B/P does not indicate the 
expected return in the no-growth case. Rather, the E/P ratio conveys the expected return, as in 
the case of mark-to-market accounting. Case II in the Internet Appendix demonstrates. 
Accounting with growth unrelated to risk and return. In the preceding accounting cases, B/P has 
no relation to the expected return. It follows that B/P comes into play only with an expected 
change in premium (and expected growth), and that is induced by reducing Earningst+1 and 
increasing subsequent earnings (growth), that is, by Earningst+1 other than permanent earnings. 
However, equation (1) is a tautology, so shifting earnings recognition from t+1 to the future has 
no necessary effect on the left-hand side: the expected return is not affected, with no effect on 
price, book value, or Bt/Pt. Case III in the Internet Appendix demonstrates.  
2.1.2 Accounting where B/P indicates the Expected Return 
The upshot of the accounting cases in section 2.1.1 is that B/P connects to risk only if the 
accounting that induces growth (and a change in premium) conveys risk such that Pt is 
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discounted to yield a higher expected return (with the lower price yielding a higher Bt/Pt that 
indicates that higher expected return). 
 To establish accounting conditions for this, we embrace the no-arbitrage Ohlson-Juettner 
(2005) valuation model. Assume the form of the model that distinguishes expected short-term 
growth from long-term growth: 
                    A1.   
)1(
)1(1 2
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g  > γ – 1 is the growth rate in expected earnings two 
years ahead (with t+1dividends reinvested) and γ is (one plus) the growth rate in subsequent 
expected abnormal earnings with the property that 

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t
t
Earnings
Earnings 1 → γ as τ → ∞; that is, γ is the 
very long-run growth rate in expected earnings. (Here a subscript greater than t indicates an 
expected value). Assume further a forecast of Earningt+2 given by 
     A2. tttt BEarningsGrDividendsEarnings   112 .                                                              
Thus,  
 
1
2 1


t
t
Earnings
B
Gg                                                                                         (1b) 
G can be interpreted as a persistence parameter for earnings, with book value adding to the 
forecast through λ. Setting γ = 1, 
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The modeling suits our empirical endeavor, for it distinguishes growth in the short term, 
g2, (for which one can observe realizations) from long-term growth (that is elusive empirically). 
Further, γ is likely to be similar for all firms (in the long run), so g2 and r are the inputs that 
discriminate in the cross-section.10 Equation (1c) sees r potentially related to both E/P and B/P, 
but our focus at this point is on B/P.  Assume further: 
      A3: λ > 0 
The three assumptions yield two propositions which are the subject of our empirical tests: 
P1.  For a given
t
t
P
Earnings 1 , the two-period-ahead earnings growth rate, g2 is increasing 
in B/P.  
P2.  For a given
t
t
P
Earnings 1 , r is increasing in B/P. 
 P1 follows from assumptions A2 and A3 under which g2 is increasing in
11
1
ROEEarnings
B
t
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equation (1b) and from the relation,
t
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B
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B 1
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 . P2 follows directly from 
equation (1c) and A3.11 Case IV in the Internet Appendix demonstrates.  
The analysis is somewhat sterile without an appreciation of the accounting that induces 
these properties and specifically λ > 0. Indeed, to predict a positive association between B/P and 
earnings growth may come as quite a surprise, for it is commonly stated (without much 
                                                 
10 The analysis can be generalized for γ > 1with no effect on the directional relation between B/P and r. And it can 
be generalized for B/P also forecasting γ. 
 
11 Permanent earnings accounting is a special case. Setting λ = 0, r
t
t
P
EarningsG 1)1(   which is satisfied for G 
– 1 = r and r
P
Earnings
t
t 1 , and B/P plays no role. (Earnings grow at the rate, r, because g2 refers to cum-
dividend earnings growth (with reinvested dividends); with full payout, there is no earning growth, as is section 
2.1.1). As that holds for all B/P, it also covers the case of mark-to-market accounting, as in section 2.1.1. 
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documentation) that B/P is negatively associated with growth―a high P/B is a growth stock, not 
a high B/P. The crucial condition in P1 is the negative relation between ROEt+1 and g2 (due to 
assumed λ > 0).  
Two features of historical cost accounting under GAAP suggest that accounting induces 
this negative correlation, and these features connect the accounting to risk. First, the “realization 
principle” that governs the allocation of earnings to periods states: under uncertainty, earnings 
recognition is deferred to the future until the uncertainty has been resolved. Deferred earnings 
imply higher expected earnings growth but also lower current earnings and ROE, ceteris paribus, 
and the application of the principle under uncertainty ties the earnings deferral to risk. As an 
empirical matter, Penman and Reggiani (2013) show that the deferral of earnings recognition is 
priced in the stock market as if it indicates risk. Second, conservative accounting reduces ROE 
by rapid expensing of growing investment, and correspondingly induces earnings growth 
(Feltham and Ohlson 1995; Zhang 2000). The rapid expensing is applied when the outcome of 
investments (in R&D and advertising, for example) are uncertain. Conservative accounting also 
reduces book value, the denominator of ROE, but that serves to yield a higher ROE and lower 
growth expectations when growth expectations are realized and uncertainty is (successfully) 
resolved (and the forecast of g2 is reduced under A2). Thus, the lower B/P associated with the 
high ROE indicates a lower expected return, in accordance with equation (1e).12  
This is only suggestive, of course, and there is no necessity that the realization principle 
and conservative accounting for risky investments are related to priced risk.13 That is the 
empirical question that tests of P1 and P2 investigate. 
                                                 
12 While the conditions for B/P to indicate the expected return in equation (1c) are developed for a positive E/P, 
GAAP accounting can produce negative E/P (and negative ROE), along with risky expected earnings growth―as 
with negative earnings and ROE due to the expensing of R&D for a start-up firm where the gamble is on the R&D 
investment paying off. We note that ROE and investment enter the Investment CAPM of Hou, Chen, and Zhang 
(2015) and the extended Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, but with a different development from that here.  
 
13 Modeling how GAAP accounting connects to priced risk is a challenging task. Ohlson (2008) lays out a model 
where modified permanent income accounting produces earnings growth, with the growth rate set to equal the risk 
premium (and P – B is increasing in the growth rate). However, the accounting does not mirror GAAP accounting. 
Note that the framework here stands in contrast to a competing framework in Lyle, Callen, and Elliott (2013) and 
Lyle and Wang (2015), for example, where the accounting is governed by an autoregressive process that also does 
not represent GAAP; such a process models declining P – B (for P > B) rather than increasing P – B due to expected 
earnings growth. 
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The analysis in this section is best viewed as that for a firm with no financing leverage, 
for leverage changes the picture.  
2.2 Expected Unlevered Returns 
A core tenet of financial economics states that financial leverage adds to expected returns, yet 
empirical research has had difficulty documenting a leverage risk premium in stock returns. In 
this section we show that the accounting framework can be utilized to distinguish the expected 
return due to operating risk from that due to financing. In contrast to most asset pricing models 
where the leverage component is presumed to be subsumed by proposed factors (without much 
explanation), the contribution of leverage to the expected return is explicit. That sets up the 
empirical work to investigate whether leverage adds to average stock returns.  
The analysis of unlevered returns recasts the balance sheet and income statement to 
identify their unlevered components. In the balance sheet, B = NOA – ND  where NOA (net 
operating assets) denotes the unlevered book value (also called enterprise book value) and ND is 
net debt. The clean surplus relation for the enterprise explains changes in NOA rather than 
changes in B.  The flows that explain the change are no longer Earnings and Net Dividends, but 
rather Operating Income from the enterprise, OI, and Net Distributions to all claimants (the sum 
of Net Dividends, d, and Net Distributions to Debt Holders, F), often referred to as  Free Cash 
Flow, FCF. NOA increase with operating income and decrease with net distributions to equity 
and net debt holders. Thus, the clean surplus relation for the enterprise states that dt+1 + Ft+1 = 
FCFt+1 = OIt+1 - (NOAt+1 - NOAt).   
Let
NOA
tP 1 be the price of the firm (enterprise price) and 
ND
tP 1 the price of the net debt. As 
equity price,
ND
t
NOA
tt PPP 111   , the dollar (levered) stock return can be expressed as:  
        
)()()( 111111
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t
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tttt PFPEPFCFPEPdPE   .                (2) 
That is, the (levered) equity return is the unlevered return after deducting the return to the net 
debt holders. The first term on the right hand side is the expected dollar (unlevered) return. 
Substituting the clean surplus relation for the unlevered firm and dividing through by
NOA
tP yields 
the expected unlevered (enterprise) rate of return,
NOA
tR 1 : 
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This is the unlevered version of equation (1a); the expected unlevered return is expressed in 
terms of the expected enterprise forward earnings yield, )( 1
NOA
t
t
P
OI
E  , and expected enterprise 
earnings growth that produces an expected change in the premium of enterprise price, 
NOA
tP 1 – 
NOAt+1. 
 It is clear that the same analysis that follows from equation (1a) to relate levered E/P and 
B/P to expected (levered) returns also follows from equation (2a) to connect unlevered 
(enterprise) E/P and B/P to unlevered returns. Indeed, the demonstrations in cases I – IV in the 
Internet Appendix are demonstrations of unlevered relationships when there in zero financing 
leverage. Note, in particular, that the conditions for B/P to indicate expected levered returns are 
also those for the unlevered B/P to indicate expected unlevered returns.  
2.3 Reconciling Levered and Unlevered Numbers and the Effects of Leverage 
In this section we show that, just as levered and unlevered returns reconcile through leverage as 
an implication of no-arbitrage, so do levered and unlevered E/P and B/P that potentially explain 
those returns. From equation (2),  
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,                                                                   (3) 
where )( 1
NOA
tRE  is the expected unlevered return, )( 1
ND
tRE  is the expected return for net debt, and 
t
ND
t
P
P
is the amount of leverage. This, of course, is the Modigliani and Miller (1958) leverage 
equation underlying the standard weighted average cost of capital calculation.  
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The same arithmetic reconciles the levered and unlevered earnings yields via financial 
leverage. Recognizing that Earningst+1= OIt+1 – Net Interestt+1 (both after-tax) and making the 
standard assumption that the book value of debt equals its market value (NDt =
ND
tP ), 
                
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(4) 
where 
NOA
t
t
P
OIE )( 1  is the forward unlevered earnings yield and 
t
t
ND
InterestNet 1
 
is the firm’s borrowing 
rate as reported in the financial statements. This expression is the accounting analog to the M&M 
expected return equation (3).  Financial leverage increases the levered E/P over enterprise E/P 
provided that the unlevered (enterprise) earnings yield is greater than the borrowing rate. 
Leverage is risky and adds to the expected return in equation (3), but leverage also adds to the 
expected enterprise earnings yield in the same way, reinforcing the point that the expected 
earnings yield is a basis for assessing risk and expected return. Leverage does not affect 
premiums: 11111111 )(   t
NOA
ttt
ND
t
NOA
ttt NOAPNDNOAPPBP if NDt =
ND
tP . Thus, the 
effect of leverage on the excepted levered return in equation (1a) is via the expected earnings 
yield. Accordingly, without E/P in the model, FF model relies on B/P (or firm size or beta on the 
market factor) to pick up leverage.  
However, it is doubtful that B/P picks up leverage. Reconciling levered and unlevered 
B/P, Penman, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) show that, if NDt =
ND
tP , 
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Financial leverage, ND/P, increases (levered) B/P for an enterprise book-to-price greater than 1, 
but reduces B/P for an enterprise book-to-price less than 1. Thus, if B/P indicates risk, it is 
unlikely that it reflects both operating risk and leverage risk in a directionally consistent way. 
Penman, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) indicate that it does not: for a sample of over 120,000 US 
firm-years over the 1962-2001 period, that paper shows that while unlevered book-to-price is 
robustly positively associated with equity returns, financial leverage is robustly negatively 
associated with equity returns given the unlevered B/P. The results are robust to violations of the 
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NDt =
ND
tP assumption. The negative relation between leverage and returns is strongest for the 
group of firms where 
NOAP
NOA
< 1. This is about 80 percent of firms and the firms where B/P is 
decreasing in leverage, so the positive relation between B/P and returns in FF is not capturing 
financial leverage. In short, both the B/P leveraging equation (5) and related empirical findings 
indicate that B/P cannot handle differences in leverage risk in the cross-section.  
 Under Modigliani and Miller (1958) conditions, leverage does not affect price but adds to 
the expected return by the M&M equation (3). By the same math that derives equation (4), it is 
easy to show that leverage also adds to expected earnings growth: 
  InterestNettOIt
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
 .                    (6) 
Thus, the added expected return from leverage ties to higher expected earnings growth: while 
leverage increases expected earnings growth in equation (6), the expected return also increases in 
equation (3) to leave price unaffected. The connection of r to expected earnings growth (with 
price unaffected) resonates with the propositions in the last subsection under which B/P is related 
to r and g2. However, leverage reduces B/P in equation (5), except for the case where 
NOAP
NOA
> 1, 
and
NOAP
NOA
is typically less than 1. Thus, higher risk and growth associated with leverage typically 
yields a lower, not higher, B/P. 
This seeming conflict is explained by the modeling earlier. There, proposition P1 links 
B/P to expected earnings growth, g2, via a negative relationship between B/P and ROEt+1 (for a 
given E/P):
t
t
tt P
Earnings
ROEP
B 1
1
1 1 

 . However, with the same math that derives equation (4), 
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Thus, while leverage increases g2, it also increases ROEt+1, provided the unlevered book rate of 
return,
t
t
t
NOA
OI
RNOA 11

  , is greater than the net borrowing rate. Accordingly, while leverage 
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increases r and g, it also increases ROEt+1, and an increase in ROEt+1 implies a lower B/P for a 
given E/P. The leverage effect on ROEt+1 implies higher g2, thus the assumption in A2 that λ > 0 
is violated. 
Accordingly, in assessing the relationship of B/P to expected return, it is important to 
differentiate the unlevered B/P from the leverage effect on (levered) B/P. This accords with 
different accounting for (unlevered) operating activities versus that for financing activities. 
Accounting that induces a positive relationship between B/P and r (by deferring earnings 
recognition under uncertainty) is applied to operating activities under GAAP. However, debt is 
approximately carried at market value. With approximate mark-to-market accounting, leverage 
has no effect on the equity premium and the effect of leverage on the expected equity return is 
captured by the E/P ratio. Case V in the Internet Appendix demonstrates.  
2.4 Characteristic Regressions 
To identify characteristics that indicate expected returns, empirical finance runs cross-sectional 
“characteristic” regression models of forward stock returns on observed characteristics to 
discover what characteristics predict stock returns. The Fama and French (1992) regression 
model with beta, book-to-price, and size is an example. The preceding analysis imposes some 
discipline on the specification of characteristic regressions, so this section lays out cross-
sectional regression models implied by that analysis. 
The analysis points to E/P as well as B/P as indicators of the expected return. However, 
the two are relevant under different accounting conditions, with B/P given weight only in the 
case of expected earnings growth and where risk is related to that growth. Thus, with accounting 
differing in the cross-section that presumably contains some no-growth firms, estimating a cross-
sectional model that applies to all firms is a doubtful exercise. However, we are interested in how 
a cross-sectional model like that of FF would be modified by our analysis and what a typical 
model would look like. Further, the earnings deferral accounting that justifies the inclusion of 
B/P as a characteristic is pervasive across the cross-section that adheres to GAAP. So, we first 
estimate a model that includes both E/P and B/P and then investigate conditions, implied by our 
framework, where the weight shifts from B/P to E/P. 
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Under our analysis, E/P is identified and B/P explains returns for a given E/P under 
specified conditions. Thus, our starting point is the following characteristic regression: 
                             
12
1
11
)(


  t
t
t
t
t
t
P
B
b
P
EarningsE
baR  .                                           (8) 
A test for b1>0 is a test of the relevance of E/P. (We also include size and beta, also FF 
characteristics, to ensure that they do not explain the omission of E/P in the FF model). The b2 
coefficient is predicted to be positive if, given E/P, B/P indicates growth that is priced as risky. 
With this starting point, we then investigate whether B/P is less important in explaining returns 
(and E/P more important) in conditions where ex ante there is presumed to be less expected 
earnings growth.   
 A characteristic unlevered return regression is similarly specified based on Equation (2a): 
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This is just a substitution of unlevered variables for the corresponding levered variables in 
regression (8). Adding leverage to explain levered returns,  
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Our framework predicts β3 > 0 if financial leverage adds to expected returns and if the included 
operating variables are sufficient to control for operating risk.  
However, the E/P and B/P leveraging equations (4) and (5) indicate that there is a “kink” 
in the relation between leverage and returns for given unlevered E/P and B/P. For B/P, the kink 
is at 
NOAP
NOA = 1. For E/P, the kink is at 
NOA
t
t
P
OIE )( 1 equal to the borrowing rate: when the unlevered 
yield is less than the borrowing rate, E/P is decreasing in leverage. The Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch BBB corporate bond index reports that the average effective yield for BBB rated 
corporate issuers over the 1996 to 2011 period is about 6.5 percent.  Thus, an after-tax borrowing 
rate of about 4 percent (a before-tax rate of 6.5 percent with a 35 percent tax rate) implies that 
the kink in equation (4) is at an unlevered E/P of 4 percent (and an unlevered P/E of 25).  
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Accordingly, our estimation of equation (10) is carried out for subsamples around these kinks. 
Further, the M&M equation (3) indicates an interaction between operating risk and leverage, a 
point stressed in Skogsvik, Skogsvik and Thorsell (2011) who note the importance of interaction 
terms when assessing the relation between leverage and returns. Our empirical tests 
accommodate this interaction. 
The test for β3 > 0 serves to validate our characteristic identification framework. Prior 
research has generally found a negative relation between leverage and equity returns, even after 
controlling for conjectured operating risk characteristics.14 This negative relation can be 
explained by leverage being negatively correlated with omitted operating risk factors. This is not 
unreasonable if capital structure decisions are endogenous with respect to the perceived cost of 
default and the after-tax benefits of debt financing.  Indeed, theoretical models of capital 
structure (Leland 1994) suggest that firms with higher levels of operating risk will endogenously 
choose lower levels of leverage.  Our framework suggests that operating risk can be identified 
through the expected enterprise earnings yield and enterprise B/P. If so, we will have controlled 
for operating risk, but only if the identified operating variables are sufficient to identify operating 
risk. This qualification is important because additional omitted characteristics (with which 
leverage is correlated) might indicate risky operating income growth.  
We benchmark our regressions against an unlevered version of the FF characteristic 
model: 
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14 Bhandari (1988) finds a positive relation between monthly returns and leverage in annual cross-sectional 
regressions over the years 1948-1966 but not from 1966-1979, and finds that most of the leverage effect is 
concentrated in Januarys in years before 1966.  Johnson (2004) finds a weak unconditional positive relation between 
leverage and future returns but, after controlling for underlying firm characteristics (for example, volatility), the 
relation between leverage and future returns becomes negative. George and Hwang (2010) document negative 
returns to leverage, which they explain with a model of market frictions related to the costs of distress. Nielsen 
(2006) finds negative returns to leverage after controlling for the three Fama and French factors and momentum, and 
attributes the negative relation to correlated operating characteristics. Other attempts to identify correlated omitted 
(operating) characteristics include Gomes and Schmid (2010) and Obreja (2013). Ippolito, Steri, and Tebaldi (2011) 
and Caskey, Hughes, and Liu (2012) attribute the negative returns to deviations from optimal capital structure.   
 
18 
 
with an accommodation for the “kink” in the B/P leveraging equation (5). This equation unlevers 
the B/P and adds leverage. Penman, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) report a negative coefficient 
on leverage from this regression (with and without beta and size, the other two FF 
characteristics) and thus conclude that the FF model does not price leverage appropriately. 
Among their conjectures is the contention that the model does not deal with operating risk 
appropriately (with which leverage may be negatively correlated). Our framework suggests that 
the earnings yield is missing. Thus regression (11) serves as a benchmark to evaluate whether the 
addition of the unlevered earnings yield in regression (10) turns the observed negative coefficient 
on leverage to positive. 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
Our analysis covers all U.S. listed firms on Compustat during the years 1962-2013 that also have 
prices and monthly stock returns on CRSP.  We exclude financial firms (with SIC codes 6000-
6999) because the separation of operating activities and financing activities is less clear for these 
firms. 
We require the following data items to be available for a firm-year to be included in our 
analysis: book value of common equity (Compustat item CEQ), common shares outstanding 
(CSHO), earnings before extraordinary items (IB), long-term debt (DLTT), and stock price at the 
end of the fiscal year (PRCC).  Other variables are set equal to zero if they are missing, but our 
results are not particularly sensitive to this treatment.  Firms with negative denominators in ratio 
calculations (such as NOA
tP ) were deleted from the sample at any stage of the analysis that 
required these numbers, as were firms with per-share prices less than 20 cents.  Our results are 
similar if we instead use a cut-off of $1.00 per-share.  A total of 170,096 firm-year observations 
are available for our analyses.  For the regression analysis, we exclude firm-year observations 
where any of the accounting ratios are in the top or bottom 2 percent of the distribution for the 
relevant year.  The number of firms available for the regression analysis each year ranges from 
298 in 1962 to 5,287 in 1997, though that number varies depending on the regression 
specification.  
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of variables involved in the analysis. We report 
percentiles for all of our primary variables based on the pooled set of data. Inferences are similar 
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when averaging percentiles from sorts each year.  The notes to the table describe how each 
variable was calculated, but a few additional comments are warranted. The regression 
specifications require forecasts of forward earnings (for year t+1). We estimate forward earnings 
to be the same as reported earnings for year t before extraordinary and special items. In support, 
the average Spearman rank correlation between realized Earningst+1/Pt and Earningst/Pt is 0.672. 
Using an estimate of forward earnings based on current (recurring) earnings not only enhances 
the coverage to the full range of B/P ratios and firms sizes but also avoids (i) the problems of 
(behavioral) biases and noise in analysts’ forecasts evidenced in Bradshaw, Richardson, and 
Sloan (2001), Hughes, Liu, and Su (2008), and Wahlen and Wieland (2011), and (ii) the 
challenge of “unlevering” earnings forecasts in a consistent manner across both analysts and 
firms.  The (market) leverage variable is calculated with the standard assumption that the market 
value of debt,
ND
tP , can be approximated by the book value of net debt, NDt.  Penman, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2007) find that estimates of Fama and French unlevered regressions are 
robust with this approximation in the cases where there have been apparent changes in credit 
worthiness that affect the market value.  
Table 2 reports average Pearson and Spearman cross-sectional correlations between the 
variables in table 1, with beta and size added.  In all cases, we calculate the pairwise correlation 
each year and report averages of correlations across years.  E/P and B/P are positively correlated 
with both levered and unlevered equity returns for the following year, consistent with the 
predictions from equation (1a).  E/P and B/P are also correlated with each other (Spearman 
correlation of 0.292).  E/P and the unlevered earnings yield, OI/PNOA, are highly correlated 
(Spearman correlation of 0.896), as are levered B/P and the unlevered B/P, 
NOAP
NOA
, (Spearman 
correlation of 0.908). Financial leverage, ND/P, has very little unconditional correlation with 
either levered or unlevered returns, but ND/P is positively correlated with both the levered and 
unlevered B/P ratios. Leverage is negatively correlated with the unlevered earnings yield.  So the 
failure of leverage to forecast returns may be due to its correlation with the operating earnings 
yield, omitted in most tests in the literature, but appearing in regression equation (8).  
4. E/P, B/P and Subsequent Earnings Growth 
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We first conduct tests of P1, a condition that is necessary for B/P to indicate expected returns in 
our framework: for a given E/P, is B/P positively related to subsequent earnings growth?  
4.1 B/P and Earnings Growth 
First, we report the unconditional correlation between B/P and subsequent earnings growth. 
Surprisingly, while it is often claimed that B/P is negatively related to growth, there is little 
documentation of the relation.15  Panel A of table 3 reports average realized earnings growth 
rates two years ahead, corresponding to g2, for ten portfolios formed from ranking firms on 
levered B/P each year, and Panel B reports average realized operating income growth rates for 
ten portfolios formed on enterprise (unlevered) book-to-price, 
NOAP
NOA
, each year. The averages are 
the mean of median growth rates for portfolios each year. These growth rates are those that an 
investor would have experienced by investing in the respective portfolios.16 To accommodate 
firms with negative earnings and a small earnings base, we compute growth rates by deflating 
earnings changes with the absolute values of the level of earnings as described in the notes to 
table 3.17 As growth in year t+2 is affected by investment in year t+1, both panels also report 
growth rates in residual earnings to control for growth from added investment.  In both cases, 
residual earnings are calculated with a charge against beginning book value using the risk-free 
rate for the relevant year.  
                                                 
15 Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2003) report a weak positive correlation between B/P and earnings growth 
when forming portfolios based on realized earnings growth over the next five and ten years.  However, in their 
regression analysis, they report no evidence of a relation between B/P and future earnings growth but a strong 
negative association between B/P and future sales growth. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) report a positive 
association between B/P and future earnings growth at least when comparing differences in geometric average 
growth rates across the top and bottom decile of stocks formed on the basis of B/P.  Finally, Chen, Petkova, and 
Zhang (2008) and Chen (2017) report a positive association between B/P and subsequent dividend growth. The 
mixed previous research on the unconditional relation between B/P and future earnings growth is not surprising as 
Penman (1996) demonstrates that B/P can be associated with high growth, no growth, and negative growth.  
Research has explored the relation between B/P and profitability (return on equity), for example in Penman (1992) 
and Fama and French (1995) who document a negative correlation between the two in the cross-section, but 
profitability is not to be confused with earnings growth. 
16 The growth rates are not an estimate of expected earnings growth rates because 
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17 The results are robust to calculations of earnings growth as total portfolio earnings in t+2 relative to that in t+1 
and are similar when we require base earnings to be positive.  
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For both levered and unlevered B/P ratios, higher B/P is associated with higher growth. The 
correlation between B/P and subsequent earnings growth at the individual firm level is low: an 
average Spearman correlation of 0.052 and an average Pearson correlation of 0.047. (The 
corresponding correlations for the unlevered numbers are 0.040 and 0.039.)  Table 3 shows the 
correlation is stronger at the portfolio level, with high B/P particularly associated with high 
growth. The same pattern is seen in the residual earnings growth rates. Further analysis (not 
reported) reveals that the positive relation between B/P and subsequent growth is primarily 
associated with mid-cap and small firms; for large firms (the top third by market capitalization), 
there is little correlation between portfolio B/P and growth. (We return to this issues in Table 6.) 
Of course, growth two years ahead is only one year of the subsequent earnings growth that is 
relevant for the determination of expected returns. However, survivorship issues overwhelm any 
attempt to measure realized growth other than for the short term.18 
4.2 B/P and Earnings Growth, Conditional on E/P 
P1 refers to the conditional correlation of B/P with growth (that is, for a given E/P), rather than 
the unconditional correlation. Panel A of table 4 reports mean realized growth rates for 25 
portfolios formed by ranking firms first on enterprise earnings yield, OI/PNOA, and then, within 
each OI/PNOA portfolio, on their enterprise book-to-price,
NOAP
NOA
.19 Figure 1 presents a graphical 
depiction. Panel B reports average residual enterprise earnings growth rates These joint portfolio 
sorts are performed each year; the table reports mean of portfolio median growth rates across 
years.  Enterprise earnings yield ranks growth negatively as expected; P/E ratios indicate growth.  
But, for a given enterprise yield, higher 
NOAP
NOA  is associated with higher subsequent growth on 
average.  Conditionally, unlevered B/P is a strong indicator of subsequent enterprise earnings 
growth. P1 is confirmed. Further analysis (not reported) partitioned firms by market 
                                                 
18 For this table and that for Panel A in Table 4, we repeated the analysis for years t+3 – t+5 ahead with similar 
results, albeit presumably with more survivorship bias.  
 
19 Penman and Reggiani (2013) report a similar matrix of portfolios, constructed by dividing the total future levered 
earnings expected in price into short-term and long-term components, and show that those portfolios are actually 
equivalent to portfolios from a joint sort on E/P and B/P (as here). Long-term earnings relative to short-term 
earnings is earnings growth, so the Penman and Reggiani (2013) results underscore our framework where the 
expected returns are increasing in expected earnings growth if that expectation is at risk.  
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capitalization and found that, for large firms, portfolio OI/PNOA and subsequent growth are 
positively related, but there is little correlation between 
NOAP
NOA
 and growth within OI/PNOA 
portfolios, expect in the lowest E/P portfolio; the conditional correlation between 
NOAP
NOA
 and 
subsequent growth is associated primarily with mid-cap and small firms. (Table 6, later, comes 
back to this point.) 
 Panels A and B show that the relationship between enterprise B/P and earnings growth is 
particularly strong in the lower enterprise E/P portfolios. The lowest E/P portfolios consist 
largely of loss firms where one might expect earnings to be particularly depressed, yielding 
higher growth if firms recover, as the table indicates they do, on average. Nevertheless, the 
differences across E/P portfolios point to a non-linearity that we accommodate in our subsequent 
analysis.  
 Panels C and D report that earnings growth forecasted by 
NOAP
NOA
 is risky. For a given 
enterprise E/P, the standard deviation of realized enterprise earnings growth rates is increasing in 
enterprise B/P in panel C, as is the inter-decile range (the 90th percentile minus the 10th percentile 
of outcomes) in panel D. The inter-decile range is of particular significance because it focuses on 
the extreme outcomes about which investors are presumably most concerned.   
Panel E reports betas (slope coefficients) from time-series regressions, for each portfolio, of 
two year ahead earnings growth rates on the market-wide earnings growth rate for the same year. 
These “earnings growth betas” are increasing in enterprise B/P for a given enterprise E/P 
portfolio. Not only is the earnings growth of high B/P portfolios more volatile (Panels C and D), 
they are also more sensitive to systematic shocks to growth. The reported earnings growth betas 
in panel E are based on earnings growth rates for the median firm in each cell.  In unreported 
tests we have repeated the estimation of earnings growth betas using aggregate earnings growth 
across all firms in each cell.  This approach will give considerably more weight to larger firms 
who are less subject to aggregate market shocks.  As expected we see similar, albeit reduced, 
differences in earnings growth betas across the 25 cells using this alternative estimation 
approach. 
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Panel F reports the fraction of firms that ceased to exist in the second year ahead due to 
performance-related reasons, as indicated by CRSP delisting codes.20  The non-survivor rates are 
higher for the low E/P portfolio dominated by loss firms, but are also higher for the high B/P 
portfolios. Across all panels in the table we see that high enterprise B/P firms are subject to more 
extreme earnings growth outcomes as evidenced by (i) the dispersion in portfolio level measures 
of earnings growth, and (ii) the sensitivity of growth to shocks to market-wide earnings growth, 
and (iii) the higher percentage of non-survivors due to either low payoffs attributable to firm 
failure and/or high payoffs due to firms being acquired by other firms. 
 In summary, given OI/PNOA, 
NOAP
NOA
 indicates not only expected earnings growth (panels A 
and B) but also the risk surrounding the expected growth (panels C - F). Not only is P1 supported 
empirically, but the risk surrounding the expected growth is also related to
NOAP
NOA
. The analysis is 
on an unlevered basis as a prelude to the analysis that adds leverage later, but results are similar 
with portfolios formed on levered E/P and B/P with levered earnings growth outcomes. 
5. Estimating Characteristic Regressions 
5.1 Regressions with Levered Explanatory Variables 
The test of P1 confirms the condition in our framework for B/P to indicate expected returns. 
With this condition satisfied, we now proceed to P2: for a given E/P, is B/P correspondingly 
related to expected returns? While the variation of earnings growth rates in table 4 indicates that 
B/P is associated with risky growth outcomes, the risk need not be priced risk. As is standard in 
empirical asset pricing, we use average realized returns to infer expected returns that reflect 
priced risk. That is, the test of P2 is under the maintained assumption of market efficiency (as is 
standard). With our interest in the FF model (with levered B/P), the focus at this point is on 
levered E/P and B/P. 
Table 5 reports results from estimating regression equations (8) and variants. Cross-
sectional regressions are estimated each year, and the reported coefficients and R2 are averages 
                                                 
20 In unreported tests, we have also examined the fraction of firms that do not have the requisite data to compute 
earnings growth in the subsequent year. The pattern is very similar to that reported in panel F. 
24 
 
of estimates across years, with t-statistics calculated as the average coefficient estimate relative 
to its standard error estimated from the time-series of the coefficients.  In unreported analysis we 
have estimated all regression specifications using monthly returns rather than annual returns, 
with similar results.   
Regression I shows that B/P is significantly positively associated with future returns, as is 
well known.  Regression II estimates equation (8): both E/P and B/P jointly indicate future 
returns, with significantly positive coefficients on both variables.  The adjusted R2 is an 
improvement over that in Regression I with B/P alone. Regression III adds the current dividend-
to-price (D/P). All else equal, dividends reduce future earnings, so the inclusion of D/P helps 
correct the forecast of forward earnings for the current payout.  Adding D/P also controls for any 
tax effects of dividends on returns and the possibility that D/P itself is an indicator of expected 
returns via expected dividend growth.  The coefficient on D/P is negative, consistent with 
earnings displacement, but it is not significant, taking nothing away from E/P and B/P as 
expected return characteristics.  
Regression IV adds beta and size, the other FF characteristics, to Regression III.  Size has 
a significant negative coefficient, with E/P and B/P retaining their significance, while beta is 
insignificant. Note also that our measure of forward earnings is only an estimate, so any variable 
that improves that estimate has a role in the regression regardless of whether it indicates 
subsequent earnings growth.   
The results for these regressions are consistent over sub-periods—1962-1975, 1976-1985, 
1986-1995, and 1996-2013—though the weight on E/P is higher in the earlier periods and the 
weight on B/P higher in the later periods.  In summary, regression specifications I to IV support 
B/P as a valid characteristic, as in the FF model, but also indicates that E/P is missing from that 
model. 
The analysis in Table 4 indicates a non-linearity across unlevered E/P portfolios in the 
relationship between unlevered B/P and subsequent earnings growth. To assess the robustness of 
the results in Table 5 to the linearity assumption underlying the regression analysis (and also to 
check on the influence of outliers), we also calculated mean t+1 returns from investing in the 
portfolios in Table 4, and also for portfolios similarly constructed from a joint sort on levered 
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E/P and B/P rather than their levered components. We merely summarize the results here; the 
detail is available on request.  
In both cases, average returns are increasing in the E/P ratios, with a significant 
difference between the high and low E/P portfolios.  Further, mean returns are also increasing in 
B/P for each of the E/P portfolios (both for the levered and unlevered ratios), with significant 
differences in mean returns between high and low B/P for a given E/P. In short, the returns align 
with the growth rates for the portfolios in Panels A and B of Table 4 and also with the measures 
of the risk around the growth in Panels C - D of Table 4.  
For these same portfolios, we also calculated “alphas” (estimated intercepts) from 
estimates of Fama and French time-series factor regressions with three factors and with four 
factors (including momentum). The significant intercepts observed confirm that the relation 
between B/P and E/P and future returns in our portfolios cannot be explained by the standard set 
of factors; the joint sort based on the characteristics identified by our framwork exposes 
meaningful variation in realized returns that cannot be explained by FF factor models. Again, 
results are available on request. 
5.1.1 Relative importance of E/P and B/P in explaining expected returns  
While these regressions indicate that both E/P and B/P typically predict returns in the cross-
section, our framework demonstrates that, in the case of no expected earnings growth, only E/P 
is relevant. B/P takes on significance only with expected earnings growth, and only when that 
growth is at risk of not meeting expectations. Accordingly, we now partition the cross-section 
into firms where a priori one expects different levels of expected earnings growth. 
 Our instrument for expected earnings growth is firm size. This is admittedly a crude 
proxy, based on the intuition that smaller firms are typically those with higher growth (and 
riskier) prospects while large firms are those where growth expectations have largely been 
achieved.21 But there is another reason to partition in size: the FF model includes size as a 
                                                 
21  In unreported results we have used alternative, non-market based measures of firm size. Specifically, we partition 
firms into deciles based on book equity and book net operating assets.  A challenge with using accounting based 
measures of size is that the very same accounting principles that give rise to risky earnings future earnings growth 
also affect current accounting estimates in the balance sheet.  Conservative accounting creates low estimates of 
balance sheet values for business models with risky investment activity, thus sorting on book estimates of size can 
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characteristic as well as B/P (and size loads negative in Regression IV in table 5). However, 
rather than viewing size as another characteristic that indicates returns incrementally to B/P, we 
view size as a condition under which the weight on E/P in predicting returns shifts to B/P.   
 We estimate weights on E/P and B/P for size partitions using the Theil-Sen robust 
estimator advocated by Ohlson and Kim (2014). These weights are the median values of w1 and 
w2 from fitting PBwPEwRt // 211   for all possible combinations of observations. Table 6 
reports the average weights for ten portfolios formed each year from a ranking on firm size.22 
The weight on E/P increases with firm size, and approaches to 1.0 for the largest portfolios, the 
weight appropriate for no growth under our framework. Correspondingly, the weight on B/P 
decreases with firm size, effectively zero for the larger firms. For smaller firms (where higher 
growth is expected), the weight shifts from E/P to B/P, again consistent with our framework. The 
table also reports mean E/P and B/P for the portfolios, with E/P increasing over portfolios and 
B/P decreasing. The fitted returns in the table are calculated by applying the weights to E/P and 
B/P for the portfolio (with an intercept).  These returns are decreasing in firm size, consistent 
with the standard observation that average returns are negatively related to size.23 The last four 
rows of the table report the same statistics for two-year-ahead realized growth rates as in Table 4. 
It is clear that the weight on B/P and the associated fitted returns are increasing in the portfolio 
mean growth rates, their variation around the mean, and their sensitivity to market-wide shocks. 
 The results here are consistent with observations (in Kothari, Shanken and Sloan, 1995 
and Asness, Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz, 2015, for example) that the B/P effect in stock 
returns is considerably weaker for large firms. But now a rationale is supplied, one that points to 
E/P for these firms rather than B/P. Andrade and Chhaochharia (2014) observe that E/P rather 
than B/P explains returns for large firms; again, a rationale is supplied here.   
                                                                                                                                                             
confound the issue.  That said, we see similar, albeit slightly weaker, relations using book equity and book net 
operating assets to partition on size.  
 
22 In a comparison with OLS coefficients, there is considerably less variation in the estimates over years, attributed 
to extreme values having less influence. 
23 These mean returns should not be interpreted as ex ante expected returns. Realized returns over this sample period 
(to which the weights were fitted) were those in an (on average) bull market. Indeed, the fitted returns are (on 
average) higher than what one typically views as a reasonable required return. This is particularly so for the small 
firms for, in this period, investing in risky growth paid off.  
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It has been observed that the FF portfolio sorts on B/P also imbed a size sort that 
obscures the weak B/P effect in large firms (in Lambert and Hübner, 2013 and Asness, Frazzini, 
Israel, and Moskowitz, 2015, for example). Consequently, there appears to be a B/P effect in 
large firms in FF only because the sort on B/P is actually a sort on size. The analysis here goes 
further, to question whether size and B/P are two separate characteristics. Size and B/P are 
clearly negatively correlated over portfolios in table 6, and both are associated with risky growth 
outcomes. Thus both may be seen as a characteristic that correlates with returns. However, our 
framework and table 6 promotes only B/P as a characteristic, but one that receives a higher 
weight with smaller firms because smaller firms have higher, riskier growth expectations.  
To be sure, firm size is but one of many potential characteristics that could be used to 
identify firms with greater expectations of risky future earnings growth.  One simple alternative 
is to directly measure investment activity that is immediately expensed, but which produces 
expected earnings growth from that investment over the initial reduced earnings. The two most 
common, and measurable, such investment activities are research and development (R&D) 
expenditures and advertising expenditures.  In unreported analysis, we have repeated the analysis 
in table 6 but instead sort firms on the intensity of R&D and advertising expenditures.  We 
assume a useful life of three years for R&D and one year for advertising, and deflate this simple 
measure of ‘intangible’ assets by either sales or net operating assets.  The results are very similar 
to that reported in table 6: for firms with greater intangible asset intensity, B/P is more important 
in explaining expected returns.  This is expected in our framework as the conservative nature of 
the accounting system defers the recognition of earnings associated with this risky investment 
activity.  In such situations, E/P is no longer a sufficient statistic for expected returns. 
Overall, the findings in table 6 confirm the insight from our identification framework that 
both E/P and B/P identify expected returns. There is, however, an inconsistency with the results 
in Fama and French (1992) who suggest that E/P is not significant in monthly cross sectional 
after controlling for size, beta, and B/P.  Our analysis here suggests an explanation. As observed, 
the FF sorts confound size and B/P such that the return spread within large firms is attributed to 
B/P rather than size. While confirming the insignificance of B/P for large firms, table 6 also 
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shows that E/P and size are positively correlated over size portfolios. Thus, for large firms where 
E/P is particularly important, size proxies for E/P.24  
 
5.2 Regressions with Unlevered Explanatory Variables and Added Leverage 
In this section, we attempt to validate our identification approach by revisiting the puzzling 
negative relation between financial leverage and future equity returns observed in previous 
papers. The negative relation has been attributed to a failure to control for operating risk 
characteristics appropriately. So, we test whether a positive relation is now observed after 
controlling for the operating risk characteristics identified.   
We start by confirming that the negative relation observed earlier holds for our sample.  
Regression I in table 7 reports the estimates of benchmark FF regression (11).  As in Penman, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2007), there is a negative relation between financial leverage and future 
returns. In unreported analysis, we split each cross-section based on whether 
NOAP
NOA
 is greater 
than or less than one, that is, around the “kink” in equation (5). As in Penman, Richardson, and 
Tuna (2007), the negative leverage relation is strongest for 
NOAP
NOA
 less than one where the 
majority of firms lie and where leverage decreases B/P; the average coefficient on leverage (not 
reported in the table) is -0.030 with an associated test statistic of -3.22. Adding beta and size to 
the regressions does not alter the picture, and thus the conclusion remains that the FF model does 
not accommodate leverage risk.  
                                                 
24 Holding aside the modelling supporting our analysis, it is important to reconcile our empirical tests with those of 
Fama and French (1992).  If we (i) restrict our time period to their sample period,1963-1990, (ii) compute ‘E’ and 
‘B’ consistent with Fama and French (1992), (iii) use the same lagging conventions (i.e., use financial statement data 
from the most recent fiscal year-end no later than December of year t when looking at returns that start in July of 
year t+1), (iv) include an indicator variable for negative firms and only compute E/P for firms where E > 0, and (v) 
use monthly return intervals as opposed to the annual  return intervals, we continue to find that both B/P and E/P are 
associated with the cross section of future stock returns.  It is only when we (i) require all components of ‘E’ and ‘B’ 
as measured by Fama and French (1992) to be non-missing (i.e., non-missing income statement deferred taxes, 
preferred dividends, and balance sheet deferred taxes), and (ii) include all firms (i.e., do not remove securities with 
closing share price of less than $0.20) that we can find a sub-sample where, empirically at least, E/P is not 
significant in explaining future stock returns.  This is not surprising as the smallest firms are those firms with the 
largest expectations for earnings growth, and one would expect B/P to be more important as it captures those 
expectations of subsequent earnings growth.   
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Regression II adds the enterprise (unlevered) earnings yield, the missing operating 
characteristic identified, to the benchmark regression, as in equation (10).  The mean coefficient 
on leverage is now close to zero. The addition of unlevered size and beta in Regression III does 
not change this coefficient significantly. These findings are similar when excluding firms with 
operating losses and those with negative net debt (that is, cash-rich firms). They also hold for 
various sub-periods from 1962-2013.25  
However, the analysis in section 2.3 indicates there is an interaction effect between 
leverage and operating risk to be accommodated. The remaining regressions in table 7 recognize 
these points by exploiting E/P leveraging equation (4). Regressions IV and V introduce the kink 
in equation (4) around the enterprise earnings yield equal to the borrowing rate with the 
condition for the leverage effect on the levered E/P to be favorable, 
NOAP
OI
> Rf. We use the 10-
year U.S. Treasury rate, Rf, as the threshold borrowing rate given the scarcity of quality 
corporate borrowing cost data back in time. For
NOAP
OI
> Rf in regression IV, the average 
coefficient on leverage is positive. Further, the average coefficient on the interaction variable in 
Regression V is reliably positive. Applying the estimated coefficients to the average values of 
both the leverage and the interaction variable in the cross-section, we find that the total effect of 
leverage is positive with an associated test statistic (not tabulated) of 2.74. Overall and in 
contrast to the typical finding in the literature, the analysis indicates a positive conditional 
relation between leverage and future equity returns. 
The coefficients on the leverage variables in these regressions could be attributable to 
leverage being related to additional omitted aspects of operating risk. But our data suggest 
otherwise.  First, there is a very low correlation between leverage and future unlevered returns in 
table 2.  Second, in unreported tests we estimate regression II in table 7 using unlevered returns 
as the dependent variable. We find a weak negative relation (test statistic of -1.34), suggesting 
(weakly) that firms with higher (lower) leverage have lower (higher) operating risk.  The 
                                                 
25 We also split on 
NOAP
NOA
 is greater than or less than one, that is, around the “kink” in equation (5). For 
NOAP
NOA
 > 1, 
the mean coefficient on leverage was marginally significant for the appropriate one-tail test, but not for 
NOAP
NOA
< 1. 
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weakness of the relation and its negative sign suggest that the positive conditional relation that 
we document between leverage and future levered returns cannot easily be explained by leverage 
capturing operating risk.  
 
5.2.1 Leverage in Ex Post Return Regressions 
The regressions in Table 7 are not very powerful for identifying differences in expected returns. 
Indeed, while the reported R2 are higher than typically observed for return regressions, they are 
still quite low. As often observed, the reason is that realized returns are a poor metric to detect 
small differences in expected returns because the variation in realized returns due to the 
unexpected return component is far greater than that of the expected return component (see e.g., 
Elton, 1999), and the relative contribution of leverage to the expected return is typically small.  
To increase the power of the tests, we repeat the analysis, but now with a control for the 
contemporaneous earnings news that explains part of the unexpected component of realized 
returns. The analysis also permits a sharper definition of favorable and unfavorable leverage 
where the directional effect of leverage on returns differs.  We estimate the following regression 
equation:  
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(12) 
The inclusion of realized enterprise earnings,
NOA
t
t
P
OI 1 , controls for unexpected returns due to the 
contemporaneous realization of earnings news. We also include lagged enterprise earnings, 
NOA
t
t
P
OI
, because extensive prior research shows that both earnings levels and changes explain 
realized stock returns (in Easton and Harris 1991, for example). 
 Table 8 reports the results.  Regression I reports the results from estimating equation 
(12). There is a positive coefficient on the realized earnings yield and a significant increase in 
average R2 over the regressions reported in table 7. This reinforces the point that expected 
earnings are at risk so that their realizations determine realized returns.  The average coefficient 
on lagged earnings is negative, indicating that lower prior earnings for a given earnings 
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realization—realized earnings growth—is associated with higher returns. This is implied by our 
framework where expected earnings growth is at risk, so realizations of growth move returns. 
After controlling for earnings realizations, there is a positive but still insignificant association 
between leverage and future returns.   
However, the effect of leverage on returns depends on whether leverage is favorable; 
leverage levers up realized returns if outcomes are favorable, but reduces returns if not. So, the 
remaining regressions in table 8 partition on the earnings realization. Regression II excludes 
firms with operating losses and the remaining regressions examine cases with earnings 
realizations greater than and less than the borrowing rate (proxied by the 10-year Treasury rate), 
the inflection point for favorable and unfavorable leverage in equation (4).  Regressions are run 
with and without leverage interaction terms. For regressions III – V that we identify with 
favorable leverage, the coefficient on leverage is strongly positive and the overall effect of the 
leverage term and the interaction term is positive. In unreported analysis, we estimate regression 
II excluding the main effect for leverage and find the coefficient on the interaction variable is 
0.909 with a test statistic of 4.81.  
Regression VI attempts to capture the case of “unfavorable” leverage. However, an 
interaction term cannot be calculated when operating income is negative (the most demonstrable 
case of an unfavorable outcome), so we include a loss dummy variable. The average coefficient 
on leverage is negative but not statistically different from zero. Thus we don’t observe a negative 
leverage effect directly. But the coefficient is considerably less than that for regression III 
covering favorable earnings outcomes.   
In unreported analysis, we also estimated the regressions by defining favorable outcomes 
as OIt+1 > OIt and unfavorable ones as OIt+1 < OIt.  For regression I for favorable news, the 
coefficient on leverage was 0.035 with a t-statistic of 2.72, while that for unfavorable news was  
-0.016 with a t-statistic of -2.14.  The interaction coefficient in regression II for favorable news 
was 1.244 (t = 3.16) and that for unfavorable news was -0.004 (t = -0.02).  In regression V (that 
excludes the leverage main effect term), the coefficient on the interaction term was 0.77 (t = 
4.16) for favorable news and -0.026 (t = -0.15) for unfavorable news.  In summary, after 
controlling for operating risk characteristics and the contemporaneous earnings news, we can 
32 
 
identify a robust positive relation between leverage and future returns, albeit asymmetric, with 
the relation stronger in the cases we have identified leverage as favorable. 
 These regressions emphasize the ex post nature of leverage. Given the negative relation 
between leverage and returns typically observed in prior research, the results are important. But 
they also shows that our framework identifies a characteristic regression model where leverage is 
priced positively.    
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper develops a framework for identifying characteristics that indicate expected returns. 
Expected returns can be described in terms of expected forward earnings and subsequent 
earnings growth under conditions prescribed by accounting principles. Characteristics that 
indicate expected earnings and subsequent earnings growth that are at risk also indicate the 
expected return for bearing that risk, assuming the market prices risk efficiently.  
The paper takes the framework to a critique of asset pricing models where book-to-price 
appears as a characteristic. We establish accounting conditions under which B/P indicates 
expected returns and those where it does not. The conditions under which B/P is a valid risk 
characteristic involve a particular form of accounting that resembles GAAP. We test empirically 
whether these conditions are satisfied. Our framework and the accompanying empirical tests 
show that B/P indicates expected returns because it forecasts expected earnings growth and the 
risk that the expectation may not be met. In one sense, the paper justifies B/P in the Fama and 
French asset pricing model. However, it also identifies E/P as missing from the Fama and French 
model.  Indeed, when there is no expected earnings growth, it is E/P that indicates expected 
returns and B/P is irrelevant. With expected earnings growth, the weight shifts to B/P, and does 
progressively more so with smaller firms where growth expectations are presumably higher. 
While the focus is on pricing models with B/P, the framework in the paper is quite general for 
identifying characteristics that pertain to risk and return. For example, Penman and Zhu (2014) 
take the framework developed in this paper to investigate a number of “anomalies” that have 
appeared in empirical analysis. 
The framework identifies characteristics that indicate the expected return due to operating 
risk versus those that indicate the financing risk premium in expected returns. The paper shows 
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that operating and financing risk characteristics combine to explain the (levered) equity return in 
the same way that unlevered stock returns and leverage combine to yield the levered equity 
return under Modigliani and Miller (1958). With the separation of operating and financing risk, 
we document a positive relation between returns and leverage. This contrasts with prior research 
that has consistently found a negative relation between leverage and equity returns, a finding 
inconsistent with basic principles of finance. We attribute the earlier negative relation as a failure 
to identify operating risk characteristics appropriately. Our finding of a positive relation further 
validates our framework. 
The paper is written under the assumption that markets rationally price risk, as is standard 
in asset pricing in identifying characteristics that indicate risk and return; in order to address this 
research, we must be on the same platform. However, we indicate the expected returns for risk 
only under this assumption. As always in empirical asset pricing, our empirical findings (and 
those in asset pricing research more generally) could be attributed to inefficient pricing if the 
characteristics predict returns because the market fails to incorporate information about future 
earnings and subsequent earnings growth. Our documentation that the predicted returns are 
associated with fundamental (earnings) risk relieves the concern, but the paper in no way 
resolves the long-standing debate about market efficiency. That, of course, requires a valid factor 
model, but the paper holds out the prospect of developing such a model, one that comes from an 
accounting-based framework. 
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Figure 1. Average enterprise earnings growth rates two years ahead (t+2) for portfolios 
formed from joint sorts of the enterprise earnings yield (OI/PNOA) and enterprise book-to-
price (NOA/PNOA) at time t. 
 
 
See notes to Tables 1 and 4 for the calculation of variables. 
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Table 1. Distribution of Variables 
 
This table reports selected percentiles of variables from data pooled over firms and years, 1962-
2013, along with averages and standard deviations. For the calculation of averages and standard 
deviations, the top and bottom 2 percent of variables each year were excluded, except for returns.  
 
Percentiles Returns Unlevered 
Returns 
E/P B/P OI/PNOA NOA/PNOA ND/P 
        
1 -0.888 -1.281 -2.103 -0.811 -1.134 -0.090 -1.074 
2 -0.817 -0.968 -1.177 -0.168 -0.634 -0.013 -0.722 
5 -0.679 -0.697 -0.487 0.056 -0.289 0.037 -0.409 
10 -0.529 -0.480 -0.211 0.139 -0.132 0.114 -0.239 
25 -0.250 -0.176 -0.015 0.304 0.003 0.332 -0.060 
50 0.042 0.055 0.047 0.571 0.048 0.657 0.153 
75 0.366 0.296 0.086 0.984 0.078 0.980 0.669 
90 0.826 0.744 0.140 1.586 0.118 1.314 1.695 
95 1.281 1.285 0.186 2.135 0.154 1.610 2.895 
98 2.091 2.480 0.254 3.032 0.222 2.171 5.674 
99 2.944 4.071 0.316 3.904 0.301 2.865 9.234 
Average 0.156 0.111 -0.005 0.751 0.017 0.710 0.516 
Std. Dev. 0.810 0.537 0.244 0.617 0.142 0.449 1.056 
 
Accounting data are from Compustat and returns and price data are from CRSP. Financial firms are excluded. There 
is a maximum of 170,096 firm-years in the calculations, though less for some variables. 
Returns, Rt+1, are buy-and-hold returns for twelve months beginning three months after the end of fiscal-year t, 
calculated from CRSP monthly returns. For firms that are delisted during the return period, the remaining return for 
the period was calculated by first applying CRSP’s delisting return and then reinvesting any remaining proceeds in a 
size-matched portfolio (where size is measured as market capitalization at the start of the return accumulation 
period). This mitigates concerns about potential survivorship bias. Firms that are delisted for poor performance 
(CRSP delisting codes 500 and 520–584) frequently have missing delisting returns, in which case a delisting return 
of −100% was applied. Final accounting data for a fiscal year are presumed to have been published during the three 
months after fiscal-year end (and before the beginning of the return period). 
Unlevered returns, NOA
tR 1 , are enterprise returns for the same annual period as the levered stock returns, calculated as 
NOA
t
NOA
tt
NOA
t PPFCFP /)( 11   , with tt
NOA
t NDPP  where ND is the book value of net debt as an approximation to 
its market value. Free cash flow, FCFt+1 = OIt+1 – (NOAt+1 – NOAt), according to the clean surplus equation for 
operating activities. For the calculation of operating income, OI, and net operating assets NOA, see below. 
Unlevered returns are calculated on a total dollar basis (rather than with per-share amounts).  
E/P is an estimate of the forward earnings yield, 
tt PEarningsE /)( 1 , with forward earnings forecast as earnings 
before extraordinary items (Compustat item IB) and special items (SPI) for the prior year, year t, minus preferred 
dividends (DVP), with a tax allocation to special items at the prevailing statutory corporate income tax rate for the 
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year. Earnings and prices are on a per-share basis, with prices observed three months after fiscal-year end, adjusted 
for stock splits and stock dividends during the three months following fiscal-year end. 
B/P, the (levered) book-to-price ratio, is book value of common equity at the end of the current fiscal-year t, divided 
by price at t. Book value is Compustat’s common equity (CEQ) plus any preferred treasury stock (TSTKP) less any 
preferred dividends in arrears (DVPA). Book values and prices are on a per-share basis, with prices observed three 
months after fiscal-year end, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends during the three months following fiscal-
year end. 
OI/PNOA is an estimate of the forward unlevered (enterprise) earnings yield, NOA
tt POIE /)( 1 , with forward enterprise 
earnings (operating income) forecast as operating income for the prior year calculated as earnings (as above) plus 
net interest expense and preferred dividends with a tax allocation to net interest at the prevailing statutory tax rate 
for the year. 
NOA/PNOA is unlevered (enterprise) book-to-price. Net operating assets is book value of equity plus book value of 
net debt. See below for the calculation of net debt. 
ND/P is market leverage at the end of fiscal-year t, with the market value of debt approximated by its book value, 
ND. Net debt is the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT), debt in current liabilities (DLC), carrying value 
of preferred stock (PSTK), preferred dividends in arrears (DVPA), less preferred treasury stock (TSTKP), all 
reduced by financial assets (“excess cash”) measured as cash and short-term investments (CHE)
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Table 2. Average Pearson and Spearman Correlations Between Variables 
 
This table reports average cross-sectional correlations for the period 1962-2013. Reported correlations are averages of annual 
correlation coefficients across the 52 years in the sample period. Pearson correlations are presented in the upper diagonal and Spearman 
correlations in the lower diagonal. For the Pearson correlations, the top and bottom 2 percent of observations for each variable are 
discarded each year with the exception of returns, beta, and size. 
 
See notes to Table 1 for calculation of variables. Betas, estimated from a maximum of 60 monthly returns and a minimum of 24 
monthly returns prior to the period beginning three months after firms’ fiscal-year end, are from market model regressions using CRSP 
value-weighted market return inclusive of all distributions. Size is the natural log on equity market capitalization. 
 
 Returns Unlevered 
Returns 
E/P B/P OI/PNOA NOA/PNOA ND/P Beta Size 
Returns  0.568 0.058 0.080 0.076 0.072 0.009 -0.021 -0.031 
Unlev Ret 0.643  0.100 0.075 0.138 0.083 -0.025 -0.014 0.028 
E/P 0.176 0.182  0.082 0.784 0.112 -0.103 -0.130 0.231 
B/P 0.118 0.104 0.292  0.115 0.878 0.315 -0.115 -0.291 
OI/PNOA 0.173 0.211 0.896 0.234  0.147 -0.098 -0.116 0.208 
NOA/PNOA 0.105 0.119 0.279 0.908 0.204  0.384 -0.152 -0.243 
ND/P 0.010 0.018 0.063 0.257 -0.095 0.462  -0.073 -0.111 
Beta -0.052 -0.031 -0.174 -0.144 -0.126 -0.164 -0.109  -0.017 
Size 0.055 0.070 0.196 -0.267 0.189 -0.244 -0.029 0.005  
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Table 3. Average Median Earnings Growth Rates Two Years Ahead for Portfolios Formed 
by Ranking Firms on Book-to-Price and Enterprise Book-to-Price 
Panel A reports means of median realized earnings growth rates and residual earnings growth 
rates two years ahead for ten portfolios formed each year, 1963-2013, by ranking firms on book-
to-price, B/P. Panel B reports mean of median enterprise earnings growth rates and residual 
enterprise earnings growth rates for portfolios formed by ranking firms each year on enterprise 
book-to-price, NOA/PNOA. 
Portfolios are formed from ranking all firm observations each calendar year, 1963-2013, on 
book-to-price, B/P (Panel A) and enterprise book-to-price, NOA/PNOA  (Panel B). Cut-offs for 
the portfolios were determined from the ranking in the prior year. Variables are defined in Table 
1. Firms with negative book values are excluded. 
 
Reported growth rates are averages of median portfolio t+2 growth rates over years, 1962-2013. 
To accommodate negative denominators, earnings growth rates are calculated as
2/)( 12
2




tt
t
EarningsEarnings
Earnings , and similarly so for operating (enterprise) income, OI. This measure 
ranges between 2 and -2. Residual earnings are calculated as Earningst+2 – (Rf × Bt+1) and 
residual OI in calculated as OIt+2 – (Rf × NOAt+1), with the growth rate over t+1 calculated in the 
same way as the earnings growth rate. Rf is the yield on the U.S. 10-year Treasury note for the 
respective year.  
 
Panel A: Mean of Median Earnings Growth Rates and Residual Earnings Growth Rates 
Two Years Ahead, in Percent 
 
B/P Decile 
 LOW 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HIGH 
HIGH-
LOW 
Earnings 8.8 9.1 9.0 8.0 9.2 8.6 9.5 10.7 14.1 19.0 10.2 
Residual 
Earnings 
2.2 3.5 4.4 4.6 6.6 7.0 10.0 12.9 17.4 24.3 22.1 
 
Panel B: Mean of Median Enterprise Earnings (OI) Growth Rates and Residual Enterprise 
Earnings Growth Rates Two Years Ahead, in Percent 
 
NOA/PNOA Decile 
 LOW 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HIGH 
HIGH-
LOW 
OI 6.6 10.8 9.9 9.2 9.1 9.6 9.1 10.0 12.1 15.0 8.4 
Residual 
OI 
-0.4 3.7 3.3 3.5 2.8 5.5 8.2 14.6 21.6 22.5 22.9 
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Table 4. Average Median Enterprise Earnings Growth Rates Two Years Ahead and 
Variation in Growth Rates, for Portfolios Formed from Joint Sorts of the Enterprise 
Earnings Yield and Enterprise Book-to-Price 
 
Panel A reports the mean of median realized enterprise earnings growth rates two years ahead for 
portfolios formed each year, 1963-2013, on enterprise earnings yield, OI/PNOA and enterprise 
book-to-price, NOA/PNOA.  Panel B reports corresponding residual earnings growth rates. Panel 
C reports the standard deviation of portfolio growth rates over the years, and Panel D reports the 
inter-decile range of growth rates. Panel E reports betas (slope coefficients) from a time-series 
regression of median portfolio growth rates two years ahead on the market-wide median growth 
rate for that year. Panel F gives non-survivor rates for the portfolios. 
 
Portfolios are formed from ranking all firm observations each calendar year, 1963-2013, first on 
enterprise earnings-to-price, OI/PNOA, and then, within each OI/PNOA portfolio, on enterprise 
book-to-price, NOA/PNOA. Cut-offs for the portfolios are determined from the ranking in the 
prior year. Variables are defined in Table 1. Firms with negative values of PNOA are excluded. 
 
Reported growth rates in Panels A and B are means of median portfolio growth rates across 
years. Standards deviations and inter-decile ranges in Panels C and D refer to portfolio growth 
rates across years. To accommodate negative denominators, growth rates are calculated as 
2/)( 12
2




tt
t
OIOI
OI  where OI is operating (enterprise) income, calculated as in the notes to Table 1. 
This growth rate ranges between 2 and -2. Residual enterprise earnings in Panel B is calculated 
as OIt+2 – (Rf × NOAt+1), with the growth rate over t+1 calculated in the same way as the OI 
growth rate. Rf is the yield on the U.S. 10-year Treasury note for the year. 
 
The betas (slope coefficients) in Panel E are from a time-series regression of portfolio growth 
rates two years ahead on the market-wide growth rate for that year. The market-wide growth rate 
is calculated using all firms in the sample for a given year. To align in calendar time, these betas 
were estimated using only firms with December 31 fiscal-year ends.  
Non-survivors in Panel F are those with delisting codes 500, 520, 550, 551, 552, 560, 561, 570, 
572, 574, 575, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 587, 589, and 591 on CRSP.  
 
 
Panel A: Mean of Median Enterprise Earnings Growth Rates (%) Two Years Ahead 
  OI/PNOA Quintile 
  LOW 2 3 4 HIGH 
N
O
A
/P
N
O
A
 
Q
u
in
ti
le
 LOW 6.6 7.6 10.9 8.6 4.0 
2 14.1 12.4 11.2 8.7 3.5 
3 23.3 14.5 12.0 7.7 3.7 
4 33.4 19.3 11.7 8.6 5.0 
HIGH 37.0 23.0 14.9 9.4 3.4 
HIGH-LOW 30.4 15.5 4.0 0.9 -0.6 
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Panel B: Mean of Median Residual Enterprise Earnings Growth Rates (%) Two Years Ahead 
  OI/PNOA Quintile 
  LOW 2 3 4 HIGH 
N
O
A
/P
N
O
A
 
Q
u
in
ti
le
 LOW 1.2 -0.7 4.8 4.0 -3.1 
2 9.4 0.5 3.0 4.7 -6.0 
3 19.8 5.3 4.8 2.2 -3.3 
4 35.1 18.7 11.5 9.4 0.6 
HIGH 38.2 30.7 28.9 18.0 -0.7 
HIGH-LOW 36.9 31.3 24.1 14.0 2.4 
 
Panel C: Standard Deviation of Median Enterprise Earnings Growth Rates (%) Two Years Ahead 
  OI/PNOA Quintile 
  LOW 2 3 4 HIGH 
 
N
O
A
/P
N
O
A
 
Q
u
in
ti
le
 LOW 13.2 12.1 6.2 5.9 9.9 
2 13.7 14.0 6.2 5.9 9.4 
3 20.0 19.6 7.7 7.4 9.7 
4 24.0 20.4 8.7 6.3 10.4 
HIGH 24.0 19.7 13.9 9.9 18.8 
HIGH-LOW 10.8 7.6 7.7 4.0 8.9 
 
Panel D: Inter-decile Range of Median Enterprise Earnings Growth Rates (%) Two  
Years Ahead 
 
  OI/PNOA Quintile 
  LOW 2 3 4 HIGH 
 
N
O
A
/P
N
O
A
 
Q
u
in
ti
le
 LOW 34.1 29.4 17.1 12.9 21.8 
2 37.7 30.6 15.2 14.0 22.9 
3 49.5 41.7 20.4 15.5 21.5 
4 67.6 41.5 24.0 14.6 24.1 
HIGH 64.4 42.4 33.6 29.8 41.2 
HIGH-LOW 30.3 13.0 16.5 16.9 19.4 
 
Panel E: Enterprise Earnings Grow Betas for Earnings Growth Two Years Ahead  
 
  OI/PNOA Quintile 
  LOW 2 3 4 HIGH 
 
N
O
A
/P
N
O
A
 
Q
u
in
ti
le
 LOW 0.71 0.94 0.73 0.81 0.94 
2 1.24 1.59 0.84 1.02 1.16 
3 1.77 1.54 0.82 0.94 1.44 
4 1.50 1.45 0.59 0.90 1.37 
HIGH 2.34 2.63 1.56 1.69 2.16 
HIGH-LOW 1.63 1.69 0.83 0.88 1.21 
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Panel F: Fraction (%) of Firms Delisted Between Year t+1 and t+2 for Performance 
Related Reasons 
 
  OI/PNOA Quintile 
  LOW 2 3 4 HIGH 
N
O
A
/P
N
O
A
 
Q
u
in
ti
le
 LOW 6.21 1.63 0.43 0.30 0.56 
2 7.20 2.07 0.39 0.31 0.63 
3 7.34 2.34 0.72 0.41 0.54 
4 8.02 3.01 0.95 0.77 1.00 
HIGH 6.29 3.47 2.17 1.39 1.51 
HIGH – LOW 0.08 1.84 1.74 1.09 0.95 
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Table 5. Average Coefficient Estimates and Test Statistics for Levered Characteristic 
Regressions 
 
This table reports average coefficients estimates from 52 annual cross-sectional regressions of 
forward stock returns (for t+1) on time-t levered characteristics, along with t-statistics and 
average adjusted R-square, 1962-2013.  
Reported coefficients are averages from yearly cross-sectional regressions for the years, 1962-
2013. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses below the average coefficient estimates, are the 
average coefficient divided by a standard error estimated from the time series of coefficient 
estimates. To minimize the influence of outliers, the top and bottom two percent of the 
explanatory variables were deleted each year. Variables are defined in notes to Table 1 and Table 
2. The divide  yield is dividends per share for year t divided by price at the end of year t, dpst/Pt.  
 
 I 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
 
Intercept 
0.081 
(2.72) 
0.069 
(2.26) 
0.081 
(2.52) 
0.152 
(3.70) 
E/P 
 
 
0.348 
(2.52) 
0.478 
(2.75) 
0.401 
(2.68) 
B/P 
0.103 
(5.97) 
0.092 
(5.51) 
0.096 
(5.29) 
0.069 
(4.58) 
Size    
-0.013 
(-2.72) 
Beta    
0.009 
(0.68) 
Div. Yield   
-0.866 
(-1.48) 
-0.536 
(-1.44) 
Adj-R2 0.015 0.026 0.039 0.055 
# Firm-Years 170,096 166,022 164,381 140,838 
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Table 6. Average Weights on E/P and B/P for Projecting Forward Stock Returns, for Ten Size Portfolios, along with Other 
Portfolio Characteristics   
 
This table reports average Theil-Sen estimates of weights on E/P and B/P for forecasting forward levered stock returns for t+1, for ten 
portfolios formed from ranking firms on size (market capitalization). The weights are estimated each year, 1963-2013, with means and 
t-statistics calculated from 51 annual estimates. The table also reports mean E/P and mean B/P for the portfolios, fitted mean returns 
from fitting the weights to E/P and B/P, and summary statistics of the distribution on portfolio median two-year-ahead growth rates 
over years. 
 
 
 Size Portfolio 
 
Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Large 
Weight on E/P 0.110 0.348 0.481 0.690 0.589 0.770 1.083 0.919 0.881 0.845 
t stat 0.99 3.65 3.88 4.47 3.82 3.01 3.37 4.81 4.50 3.49 
Weight on B/P 0.101 0.118 0.124 0.107 0.103 0.061 0.066 0.052 0.023 -0.004 
t stat 7.54 6.51 7.65 5.45 5.79 2.18 3.16 2.38 1.02 -0.19 
           
Mean E/P -23.02% -6.59% -1.95% 0.50% 2.34% 3.76% 4.82% 5.54% 6.00% 6.81% 
Mean B/P 1.354 1.028 0.924 0.831 0.761 0.723 0.660 0.618 0.582 0.545 
Fitted Return 31.09% 23.26% 22.95% 18.06% 18.40% 13.00% 13.82% 13.70% 10.34% 7.89% 
           
Mean Earnings Growth Rates, t+2 16.1% 13.9% 10.1% 10.2% 9.1% 9.2% 9.1% 9.9% 9.5% 8.5% 
St. Dev. of Earnings Growth Rates 17.0% 12.7% 12.2% 10.4% 10.1% 10.1% 8.7% 7.4% 7.2% 6.9% 
IDR of  Earnings Growth Rates 44.4% 35.4% 32.7% 28.6% 27.1% 29.1% 25.9% 19.1% 16.6% 15.7% 
Earnings Growth Betas 1.403 1.223 1.218 1.267 1.014 1.135 0.815 1.030 0.952 0.742 
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Table 7. Average Coefficient Estimates and Test Statistics for Unlevered Characteristic 
Regressions 
 
 
This table reports average coefficients estimates from 52 annual cross-sectional regressions of 
forward stock returns (for t+1) on time t operating characteristics and leverage, along with t-
statistics and average adjusted R-square, 1962-2013. 
See notes to Table 5. Unlevered size is the natural log of enterprise market capitalization, 
measured as equity market capitalization plus the book value of net debt (in millions of dollars). 
Rf is the yield on the U.S. 10-year Treasury note for the relevant year. All other variables are 
defined in notes to Table 1 and Table 2. Firms with negative values of PNOA are excluded. 
 
 I 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
OI/PNOA>Rf 
V 
OI/PNOA>Rf 
Intercept 0.069 
(2.13) 
0.050 
(1.55) 
0.139 
(3.34) 
0.028 
(0.83) 
0.045 
(1.40) 
OI/PNOA  
 
0.655 
(3.39) 
0.546 
(3.53) 
1.364 
(5.13) 
1.176 
(5.04) 
NOA/PNOA 0.126 
(6.12) 
0.093 
(4.60) 
0.070 
(3.58) 
0.029 
(1.55) 
0.029 
(1.52) 
UnLevSize   -0.015 
(-2.71) 
  
Beta   0.011 
(0.77) 
 
 
 
ND/P 
 
-0.017 
(-2.15) 
-0.002 
(-0.21) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.036 
(2.17) 
-0.046 
(-1.60) 
OI/PNOA*ND/P     1.018 
(2.71) 
Adj-R2 
# Firm-Years 
0.018 
164,657 
0.032 
160,929 
0.057 
138,147 
0.021 
56,808 
0.022 
56,808 
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Table 8. Average Coefficient Estimates and Test Statistics for Characteristic Regressions with Realized Returns and Realized 
Earnings 
 
This table reports average coefficients estimates from 51 annual cross-sectional regressions of stock returns for year t+1on the 
contemporaneous realized enterprise earnings yield for the same year, leverage and other characteristics, along with t-statistics and 
average adjusted R-square, 1962-2012.  
Reported coefficients are averages from yearly cross-sectional regressions for the years, 1962-2012. The t-statistics, reported in 
parentheses below the average coefficient estimates, are the average coefficient divided by a standard error estimated from the time 
series of coefficient estimates. To minimize the influence of outliers, the top and bottom two percent of the explanatory variables were 
deleted each year. Variables are defined in notes to Table 1 and Table 2. Firms with negative values of PNOA are excluded.  ILOSS is an 
indicator variable equal to one when OIt+1 < 0, and zero otherwise.  
NOA
tt POI /1  
is the realized operating income in year t+1 relative 
enterprise price at t and Rf is the yield on the U.S. 10-year Treasury note for the relevant year. 
 I 
 
II 
NOA
tt POI /1 > 0 
III 
NOA
tt POI /1 >Rf 
IV 
NOA
tt POI /1 >Rf 
V 
NOA
tt POI /1 >Rf 
VI 
NOA
tt POI /1 <Rf 
Intercept 0.028 
(0.86) 
-0.009 
(-0.33) 
0.034 
(0.91) 
0.064 
(1.83) 
0.047 
(1.31) 
0.016 
(0.46) 
NOA
tt POI /1  2.652 
(8.26) 
4.461 
(15.28) 
4.596 
(11.10) 
4.252 
(12.47) 
4.407 
(11.90) 
2.147 
(2.97) 
NOA
tt POI /  -1.747 
(-6.73) 
-2.361 
(-8.98) 
-2.535 
(-8.66) 
-2.468 
(-9.05) 
-2.428 
(-9.29) 
-1.353 
(-4.71) 
NOA
tt PNOA /  
 
0.085 
(4.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.41) 
-0.044 
(-2.06) 
-0.043 
(-1.97) 
-0.052 
(-2.14) 
0.039 
(1.33) 
NDt/Pt 0.007 
(0.70) 
-0.052 
(-2.78) 
0.084 
(5.68) 
-0.072 
(-2.32) 
 -0.010 
(-0.68) 
NOA
tt POI /1 *ND/P  1.468 
(4.22) 
 1.616 
(3.39) 
1.009 
(4.83) 
 
ILOSS      -0.068 
(-1.46) 
Adj-R2 0.134 0.183 0.153 0.167 0.161 0.099 
No. of Firm-Years 149,972 115,852 61,311 61,311 61,311 88,661 
 
